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Abstract 
 
On 30 March 2007, Italy signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) and ratified it by Law 18/2009. Through this, Italy has committed 
itself to reforming the structure of its own policy making process. It seems that Italy has 
taken its international commitment seriously, in compliance with Art. 117(1) of the Italian 
Constitution, for the last years have witnessed attempts to ‘re-imagine’ the configuration of 
the whole ‘institutional’ disability domain. It is nonetheless surprising that the efforts at 
national level are not counterbalanced by identical commitments in the Regions (despite 
their important powers in the disability domain). 
This essay aims to investigate the most intriguing aspects of current disability policy 
making, without neglecting empirical insights and dropping some comparative hints. This 
article is divided into six sections. After a succinct introduction, the main features of the 
Convention will be recalled. Then, the CRPD will be framed to fit the Italian legal order. 
Section 4 and 5 focus on how disability policy making has been reshaped in the process of 
the implementation of Art. 33 CRPD in the Italian legal system. Section 6 will provide 
concluding remarks.  
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1. Introduction 
 
On 30 March 2007, Italy signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (hereafter CRPD, or simply “the Convention”) and ratified it by Law 18/2009.I 
By acceding to the Convention, Italy has committed itself not only to higher standards of 
non-discrimination with respect to persons with disabilities and to improving accessibility 
and social inclusion, but also to reforming the structure of its own policy making process. 
The CRPD contains specific provisions that respond to the need to translate the rights of 
disabled people into concrete domestic law, policies and good practices. In particular, in 
addition to the international monitoring system and quasi-judicial mechanism set forth, 
respectively, in Art. 34 CRPD and in the Optional Protocol, Art. 33 CRPD requires Parties 
to create or designate specific national institutions which will be responsible for 
implementation and a framework which will be in charge of ‘monitoring’, with the former 
being placed under government oversight and the latter independent and inclusive of civil 
society organisations (Stein and Lord, 2010; Marchisio et al., 2010; de Beco, 2012). 
In line with the call from the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights 
(OHCHR) to consider Art. 33 CRPD a priority (UN Human Rights Council, 2010), Italy 
has started the implementation process by ‘reshaping’ its own disability policy making. In 
spite of the harsh economic crisis that has deeply affected the country, the focal point and 
the coordination mechanism were designated and a monitoring body, the “National 
Observatory on the Situation of Persons with Disabilities” (Osservatorio Nazionale sulla 
condizione delle persone con disabilità – hereafter National Observatory), was set up through the 
ratification instrument. Additionally, Italy is (slowly) commencing to reform the legislation 
in force, with the view of realising the objectives of the Convention.  
Italy has taken its international commitments seriously, in compliance with Art. 117(1) 
of the Italian Constitution: these years have witnessed some attempts to ‘re-imagine’ the 
configuration of the whole disability domain, and so far the prospects for an efficient 
implementation of the CRPD are quite encouragingII. Nonetheless, even if there has been a 
general presumption of compliance of these structures with the Convention, there is still a 
considerable gap between the aspirations of Art. 33 and Italy’s achievements. Looking 
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closely at both the designated focal point and the National Observatory, several 
weaknesses could be identified. In particular, on the one hand there is a weak involvement 
of the Regions, and, on the other hand, the National Observatory appears as a hybrid body 
(to some extent, it seems more similar to the ‘coordination mechanism’), which de jure and 
de facto can hardly be considered in compliance with Art. 33(2) CRPD. 
Thus, the time seems ripe for a more robust debate among legal scholars and a more 
reflective advocacy to expand the reach and the effectiveness of the disability policy 
making structure created subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention.  
This essay aspires to be read as a basis for future academic exploration. It aims to 
investigate the most intriguing ‘institutional’ aspects of current disability policy in Italy, 
without neglecting empirical insights and comparative hints. The implementation of Art. 33 
CRPD at the national level will be critically discussed vis-à-vis the lack of involvement of the 
Regions.  
With regard to its structure, this essay is divided into further five sections, following 
this brief introduction. First, the main features of the Convention will be recalled (Section 
2). Then, Section 3 will ‘frame’ the CRPD in light of the Italian legal order: both the 
ratification process and the status of the Convention will be discussed briefly. Section 4 
and 5 will focus on how disability policy making has been ‘reshaped’ in the process of 
implementation of Art. 33 CRPD. Finally, Section 6 will conclude with some general 
remarks. 
 
2. The CRDP: Principles, Main Features and “Policy Making 
Obligations” 
 
In December 2006, the CRPD and its Optional Protocol were approved by the UN 
General Assembly. The Convention, which entered into force on 3 May 2008, is the first 
human rights treaty of the 21st century and represents a landmark piece of international law 
(Quinn, 2009, 89). Traditionally, both national and international norms have tended to 
think of the disadvantageous situation of disabled persons as reflecting their specific 
impairments, physical or mental, rather than as a result of discrimination or otherwise 
inadequate respect for human rights (Quinn and Arnardottir, 2009: passim). By contrast, the 
CRPD embodies the official recognition of disability as a human rights issue, and affirms 
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the ‘social’ model as opposed to the ‘medical’ model of disability (Barnes and Mercer, 2010: 
18 et seq.).III The scope of the Convention is extremely broad: the text does not simply 
prohibit disability discrimination, but it also covers civil, political, economic, cultural and 
social rights and is built upon the core and manifold concepts of the dignity of each 
individual, autonomy, and self-determination.  
The Convention includes an introductory set of provisions outlining its purpose and 
key definitions (Arts. 1-2). Art. 2 provides, inter alia, a comprehensive definition of 
discrimination, including ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability 
which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms’. 
Articles 3-9 CRPD set out general provisions to be applied throughout the treaty text. In 
view of the subsequent analysis, it must be observed that Art. 4 CRPD requires Parties to: 
take measures to abolish disability discrimination; engage in the research and development 
of accessible goods, services and technology for persons with disabilities and to encourage 
others to undertake such research; provide accessible information about assistive 
technology to persons with disabilities; promote professional and staff training on the 
Convention rights for those working with persons with disabilities; and to consult and 
involve persons with disabilities in developing and implementing legislation and policies 
and in decision-making processes concerning CRPD rights. Significantly, Art. 4 further 
requires Parties to adopt an inclusive policy approach to protect and promote the rights of 
persons with disabilities in all laws and programmes. This suggests the need for a screening 
exercise to assess policy and laws vis-à-vis the Convention, and programming inclusion 
across sectors. This, on the one hand, suggests the very idea of mainstreaming and, on the 
other hand, obliges States to ‘re-think’ their whole disability policy making. 
Arts. 10 through 30 enumerate the specific substantive rights, which are formulated as 
obligations upon States: the right to life (Art. 10), freedom from torture (Art. 15) and other 
forms of abuse (Art. 16), the right to education (Art. 24), employment (Art. 27), political 
participation (Art. 29), legal capacity (Art. 12), access to justice (Art. 13), freedom of 
expression and opinion (Art. 21), privacy (Art. 22), participation in cultural life, sports and 
recreation (Art. 30), respect for home and family (Art. 23), personal integrity (Art. 17), 
liberty of movement and nationality (Art. 18), liberty and security of the person (Art. 14), 
and adequate standard of living (Art. 28).  
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In addition, the Convention pays attention not merely to what ‘ought to be done’ but 
also to the institutional preconditions necessary to ensure that it ‘can be done’ at the 
domestic level (Quinn, 2009a: 215). Gerard Quinn has emphasised these as striking 
‘process-based innovations’ (Quinn, 2009b: 215). In particular, the need to translate the 
Convention’s provisions into hard domestic law, policies and good practices is embedded 
in the final provisions, namely in Arts. 31-40 CRPD. Among these provisions, Art. 33 is 
certainly the most relevant. It sets forth a complex mechanism of internal follow-up 
procedures. As mentioned above, it requires Parties to intervene in the very structure of 
their policy making process to make the rights of people with disability really effective 
(Seatzu, 2009).  
Art. 33(1) CRPD states that Parties to the Convention must designate ‘one or more 
focal points within their governments for matters relating to the implementation of the 
Convention’. The OHCHR envisages several focal points, plus an overall focal point which 
responds to the need to ensure the existence of a general oversight and promotion role 
(UN Human Rights Council, 2010). The focal point(s) must be situated at governmental 
level and should develop and coordinate a coherent national policy on the Convention. In 
other words, the focal point(s) should both drive and execute national disability policies. 
According to Art. 33(1) CRPD, Parties to the Convention can also designate a 
“coordination mechanism”. The creation of such a coordination mechanism is desirable 
but not compulsory. If created, the coordination mechanism should be located within the 
government and perform the tasks of further supporting and coordinating (as its 
denomination suggests) the implementation of the CRPD across all sectors and levels of 
government. However, there is no clear distinction between the focal point and the 
coordination mechanism, neither from the point of view of structural requirements nor as 
regards the functions to be performed. 
Art. 33(2) requires Parties to designate or establish a ‘framework, including one or 
more independent mechanisms’, to promote, protect and monitor the implementation of 
the Convention. Parties enjoy significant latitude regarding what this framework should 
consist of. The wording of the Convention seems to leave the door open to: the creation of 
a new ad hoc framework, which includes a new, independent mechanism and other new 
bodies; the designation as a framework of a single, existing or new independent 
mechanism; or to the sharing of tasks among different (existing and new) entities, which 
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should form a coherent whole. It is fairly clear that the framework must be capable of 
carrying out the functions explicitly indicated in Art. 33(2) and must include one or several 
independent mechanisms. It is well established that, in designating or establishing such a 
mechanism, Parties to the Convention ‘shall take into account’ the Principles relating to the 
Status and Functioning of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.IV 
These principles, known as the Paris Principles, provide for the responsibilities, composition 
and working methods of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) according to the 
following headings: competence and responsibilities; composition and guarantees of 
independence and pluralism; methods of operation; and principles concerning the status of 
commissions with quasi-jurisdictional competence (the latter being only optional).V This 
reference to the Paris Principles can raise criticism: it is not clear whether it is really possible 
to apply these principles to actors other than NHRIs nor, from a more substantive point of 
view, who will evaluate the compliance of independent mechanisms with them. In addition, 
the use of the expression ‘shall take into account’ literally seems to mean that the Paris 
Principles provide a source of inspiration , rather than a compulsory parameter, in 
transposing Art. 33(2) CRPD. Despite this criticism, it is now accepted that ‘the Paris 
Principles provide important guidance to identify the characteristics the framework should 
overall possess, while accepting that not all components of the framework need to be fully 
compliant with the Paris Principles’. In other words, the OHCHR clarifies that the Paris 
Principles should apply, without any distinction (UN Human Rights Council, 2010), to the 
independent mechanisms, including to mechanisms other than NHRIs (De Beco, 2011). 
Art. 33(3) provides that ‘civil society, in particular persons with disabilities and their 
representative organizations, shall be involved and participate fully in the monitoring 
process’. This provision thus further specifies the general principle of participation of 
people with disabilities (Article 3(c) CRPD), as well as the general obligation to consult 
with and actively involve persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, 
through their representative organisations in “the development and implementation of 
legislation and policies to implement the present Convention, and in other decision-making 
processes concerning issues relating to persons with disabilities” (Article 4(3) CRPD). In 
light of these provisions, persons with disabilities and their representative organizations 
must be involved in the implementation process carried out by the governmental structures 
established under Art. 33(1). In this respect, the wide consultation of a variety of interested 
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parties is an important means of ensuring that measures taken are acceptable and practically 
workable for persons with disabilities.  
Finally, it is worth recalling that, whilst the Convention lacks a judicial enforcement 
system, Art. 34 provides for an international para-judicial monitoring mechanism (the 
“Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”), itself regulated by the Optional 
Protocol. Art. 35 provides for a reporting system: according to this provision, each State 
Party must submit a comprehensive report to the Committee on measures taken to give 
effect to its obligations under the Convention and on the progress of the implementation 
process. 
 
3. Framing the CRPD and the International Obligation to Intervene on 
Disability Policy Making in the Italian Legal System  
 
3.1 The ratification of the CRPD 
As mentioned above, Italy ratified the CRPD through Law 18/2009, two years after 
signing, and within three years of UN approval (de Amicis, 2009). No reservations to the 
Convention were made upon signature and ratification. 
The ratification process was quite quick if compared to that of other European 
countries, some of them still in the process of concluding the Convention.VI The inherent 
importance of the CRPD and the need to radically change the detrimental situation 
experienced by the majority of people with disabilities (Chiatti and Lamura, 2010)VII was 
acknowledged by all political parties. A– considering the troubled Italian political system – 
extraordinary consonance was found in both chambers and can be read as a signal of the 
perception of the seminal ideological shift inherent in the Convention. The Senate, almost 
unanimously, approved the ratification bill presented by the Government in January 2009, 
rejecting the criticism raised regarding the limited presence of people with disabilities 
within the National Observatory and its inadequate financial equipment (which was 
ensured by extracting money from the social fund).   
Even if a study to assess the overall compliance of domestic legislation and policies 
with the CRPD was carried out in 2008 by the Institute of International Legal Studies at 
the National Research Council (Istituto di Studi Giuridici Internazionali, ISGI; Consiglio 
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Nazionale delle Ricerche, CNR) upon the request of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies 
(ISGI, 2007), no amendments or other actions to eliminate the few inconsistencies 
highlighted by this study were provided for. No preliminary scrutiny of regional laws took 
place beforehand. It seems that the organizations representing people with disabilities 
(DPOs) did not enforce a comprehensive preliminary scrutiny of all national and regional 
rules on disability since they feared this would have delayed the approval of the ratification 
bill.  
Notably, the negotiation of the Convention was conducted within the framework of 
the European Union (EU). Whereas this circumstance has not per se accelerated the process 
of ratification, it is safe to say that strong coordination at EU-level has created not only a 
positive attitude towards ratification, but also an additional commitment to ratify the 
CRPD, in compliance with the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Art. 4(3) 
TEUVIII.  
 
3.2 Status and effects of the CRPD 
The Convention was ratified through an ordinary law in compliance with Art. 80 of the 
Italian Constitution and enjoys prima facie the same position in the hierarchy as other 
ordinary laws. However, ever since the 2001 constitutional reform, Art. 117(1) provides 
that ‘legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the 
Constitution and within the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international 
obligations’.IX This provision seems to establish a higher status (namely a sub-constitutional 
one) for international sources of law.  
Up to now, the most of the Constitutional Court’s judgments interpreting Art. 117(1) 
have pertained to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR; e.g. cases No. 348 
and 349/2007 and the subsequent decisions No. 311/2009, No. 317/2009, No. 80/2011 
and No. 113/2011). Nonetheless, they provide a firm guidance for determining the status 
of the CRPD in the Italian legal order. It must be recalled that, ever since the 
‘overcommented’ twin cases No. 348 and 349/2007, the Court has shown an increasing 
openness towards international law (inter alia Ruggeri, 2008, Pollicino, 2008; Martinico and 
Pollicino, 2010). The Court firmly stated that Art. 11 Const. does not apply to the ECHR, 
nor to other international treaties (irrespective of their subject matter).X As noted by 
Fontanelli and Biondi, the Court restated the plain ‘general rule according to which, in the 
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absence of any specific constitutional provision, international norms enter the Italian 
system with the same rank as the Italian legal acts that implement them’, but affirms that 
‘[t]he platform of Article 117(1) guarantees an infra-constitutional standing to international 
treaty law (ECHR included) within the Italian legal order’ (Fontanelli and Biondi Dal 
Monte, 2008). There is a difference of treatment of EU law, which is considered to have 
quasi-constitutional status and, consequently, to be subordinated not to the entire 
Constitution, but only to its fundamental principles (this is the famous counter-limits 
doctrine). In addition, the Court’s formal hierarchy-based approach excludes any power for 
common judges to set aside national legislation in conflict with the ECHR (and, of course, 
with other international treaties, including the CRPD).  
From this it can be inferred that the national norms ratifying the CRPD (like norms 
ratifying and executing other international treaties) cannot be abrogated by a subsequent 
law (i.e. resistenza passiva all’abrograzione). In addition, with regard to the Constitutional 
Court’s judgments, it has emerged that national judges have to interpret, as far as possible, 
domestic provisions in a manner consistent with international provision (D’Amico e 
Randazzo, 2009). When such an interpretation is not feasible, or when a judge doubts an 
international norm’s constitutionality, a constitutional review is necessary on the basis of a 
potential violation of Art. 117(1) of the Italian Constitution.  
However, the status and the effects of the CRPD cannot simply be those of other 
international sources. This is so because the CRPD is a mixed agreementXI, thus it is, at 
least partially, EU law and should be treated as such. Could we then argue that national 
judges, in situations governed by EU law, are under the obligation to disallow a domestic 
provision that contradicts with the CRPD? Indeed not. Because, in abstracto, the CRPD 
seems capable, in light of its objectives and spirit, of conferring rights upon individuals, but 
the provisions are literally addressed to the Parties. Thus, it might be argued that none of 
its provisions is sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to have direct effect under the 
standard established long ago by the ECJ. Only the ECJ can consider whether or not an 
international provision has direct effect. Thus, in situations governed by EU law (e.g. State 
aid), a judge suspecting a contradiction between a domestic provision and the CRPD 
should probably ask for a preliminary ruling under Art. 267 TFEU. In areas that are clearly 
outside of EU competence, the judge should first attempt to interpret the national 
provision in a manner consistent with the Convention. If, despite this attempt, a 
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contradiction between a domestic provision and the CRPD still persists, the judge should 
ask for a constitutional review. 
Up to now, Italian judges have resolutely applied the principle of consistent 
interpretation. After the entry into force of the CRPD, many significant cases issued in 
front of lower courts have interpreted Italian law in light of the principles enshrined in the 
Convention. One of the first and most relevant cases was the decision issued by the 
Tribunale di Varese on 6 October 2009, in which the court stated that the pragmatic features 
(modalities) of the ‘support administration’ provided for in Arts. 405 et seq. of the Italian 
civil code must be determined with regard to the CRPD (Falletti, 2010; Ferrando, 2010).XII 
In recent decisions, administrative tribunals have interpreted the provisions on public 
contributions to cover the cost of residential treatment for people with disabilities (Art. 
3(2-ter) of Legislative Decree 109/1998 and Art. 6 of Law 328/2000) in light of the 
CRPD.XIII The Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) has also relied on the CRPD. It is worth 
recalling its decision of 22 February 2010,XIV when the ICC declared unconstitutional a 
provision of the Budget Law 2008 (namely Art. 2(413) and (414) of Law 244/2007) which 
fixed the number of support teachers for children with disabilities in public schools and 
abolished the possibility (provided for in Art. 40 of Law 104/1992) to hire additional 
support teachers with fixed-term contracts in order to provide specific additional 
educational assistance to children with serious disabilities (Troilo, 2012). The ICC declared 
that Art. 2 of the Budget Law infringed upon the right to education of children with 
disabilities, which is set forth in Art. 38(3) and (4) of the ConstitutionXV, and the principle 
of equality. Nonetheless, in defining the content of the fundamental right to education, and 
as part of its ratio decidendi, the Court referred to Art. 24 of the CRPD.  
 
4. Reshaping Italian Disability Policy Making 
 
4.1 The Directorate-General for Inclusion and Social Policies as a Focal Point 
As mentioned above, Italy has taken the obligation to ‘re-shape’ disability policy 
making very seriously. It thus started the CRPD implementation process by designating the 
focal point and the coordination mechanism: both of them coincide with the Directorate-
General for Inclusion and Social Policies (hereafter ‘the Directorate’), which recently 
replaced and absorbed both the Directorate-General for Inclusion, Social Rights and Social 
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Responsibility and the Directorate-General for Governing the Social Policy Fund and 
Monitoring Social ExpensesXVI. Unsurprisingly, as in the majority of EU Member StatesXVII, 
Italy thus designated as focal point for matters relating the implementation of the 
Convention an internal organisation of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, and it 
seems that no other options had been considered.  
The Directorate has (probably) been deemed by the Italian authorities to be the most 
appropriate focal point since it has traditionally been in charge of disability matters. 
Nonetheless, even if the requirement that the focal point(s) must be at governmental level 
is fully accomplished, this choice could be questioned. 
In general, the preference for a social affairs-related structure has been criticised by 
many commentators (EFC, 2010) and by DPOs since this does not fully reflect the 
comprehensive human rights approach to disability envisaged by the CRPD. It was 
suggested that the focal point should have been placed within ministries dealing with 
justice, human rights or under the jurisdiction of the office of the Prime Minister to 
symbolize the rejection of the outdated model of compartmentalising persons with 
disabilities solely based on their perceived inadequacies.XVIII As regard Italy, the scope of 
action of the Directorate may seem, at a first sight, too weak to transform (or, better still, 
to revolutionize) the still limited scope of disability policy. One might also sustain that the 
Directorate is too ‘specialized’: it does not cover all the fields touched upon by the 
Convention, but mainly addresses issues related to employment, social affairs, and non-
discrimination without any (at least explicit) wide-ranging rights-based approach. It might 
also be argued that, in view of effectively implementing the CRPD’s far-reaching 
provisions, other structures should have been elected as ‘focal point’: e.g. the 
Interministerial Committee for Human Rights (Comitato interministeriale per i diritti umani, 
CIDU) attached to the Ministry of Foreign AffairsXIX. This body could be deemed more 
appropriate to reflect the human rights-based approach of the Convention. In addition, the 
CIDU already plays the role of focal point as regards other UN treaties and the Council of 
Europe and, in any event, it will be in charge of submitting/presenting a report to the 
CRPD Committee as well as preparing answers and explanations if requested so by the UN 
organ. Another option that would have deserved to be explored is the choice of the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers (i.e., the Prime Minister) as focal point:  in this case, 
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the focal point would have had the significant power to require cooperation from other 
ministries, thus mainstreaming disability. 
Despite this criticism, it must be recognised that the choice does not automatically 
neglect the conception of disability as a human rights issue, nor the social model itself. The 
Directorate fulfils many of the expectations as to what a focal point should do, and its 
mandate includes the tasks to build capacity within the government on disability-related 
issues and to contribute to the development of policies and legislation that affect disabled 
people. In addition, from the very beginning the Directorate has pursued the aim of 
implementing the social model of disability as envisaged by the Convention and, since it 
also acts as the secretariat within the National Observatory (as it will be discussed 
further),XX has attempted to create fruitful conditions in order to mainstream the rights of 
people with disability. 
Like other countriesXXI, Italy clearly opted for a single focal point: unlike for example in 
France,XXII where all administrations, services and bureaus involved in disability policy are 
responsible for matters related to the implementation of the CRPD, no other focal points 
at the ministerial level were formally appointed; nor were regional focal points designated. 
Even if there is no fixed scheme, different horizontal focal points dealing transversally 
with disability policy within their respective competences have been considered a viable 
and remarkable solution, in particular to foster the implementation of the social model 
envisaged by the CRPD (de Beco, Hoefmans 2009). In this respect it might be noted that 
the Italian option of a single focal point at the ministerial level can prove useful for 
rationalising and centralising all possible institutional players involved in disability policy 
and represents considerable strengths. A single focal point can be the driver of a consistent 
national disability policy agenda and may be more efficient, since it avoids duplication of 
functions. By contrast, a proliferation of focal points may seriously endanger the efficiency 
and effectiveness in the implementation of the Convention. A single focal point minimises 
the risk that when many are comptenet, in the end no one is really responsible for the 
proper transposition of the CRPD into the domestic legal framework. Moreover, in times 
of economic crisis, a single focal point is probably ‘less expensive’ and makes it possible to 
devote resources to the substantive implementation rather than to structural aspects. Lastly, 
it is easier both for persons with disabilities and international institutions to identify the 
body responsible for implementation.   
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In any case, and regardless of any reproach that can be raised, the capacity of the 
Directorate as a focal point to competently and resourcefully carry out the tasks provided 
for in Art. 33(1) and to mainstream disability is to be verified in concreto and in the long run. 
Up to now, there are no major achievements directly and exclusively attributable to the 
Directorate itself.XXIII However, the Directorate has occasionally collected suggestions for 
legislative reform by civil society actors, thereby maintaining a link with NGOs and 
citizens. In addition, and as we will discuss in the subsequent section, in its capacity of 
technical secretariat to the National Observatory (Art. 4 of Decree 167/2010), it has 
provided a remarkable contribution to preparing the biannual action plan on disability. 
 
4.2 Where Are the Regions? 
Several focal points covering each of the different layers of government (local, 
provincial, regional, national) have also been envisaged to ensure the implementation of the 
CRPD in regional or federal states, involving all territorial administrations which have 
relevant competences in the fields covered by the CRPD (de Beco, Hoefmans, 2009: 
passim). In order to ensure the respect of their territorial structures, some EU States have 
opted for several focal points, for example the UKXXIV, BelgiumXXV or AustriaXXVI By 
contrast Italy, which can certainly be described as a regional (Anzon-Demmig, 2008; Caretti 
and Tarli Barbieri, 2009) or even a ‘de facto federal system’ (Bilancia et al., 2010), chose 
quite surprisingly to create a single focal point, and this choice cannot but be questioned. 
It should be recalled that the legislative competence over disability matters is shared 
between the State and the Regions, and that the boundaries between their respective 
competences are not clear as they pretend to be. Art. 117 of the Italian Constitution gives 
the State the exclusive legislative power over the ‘determination of the basic level of 
benefits relating to civil and social entitlements to be guaranteed throughout the national 
territory’ (so called LEP). According to this provision, national law must define binding 
financial thresholds which are essential to guaranteeing civil and social rights. The Regions 
cannot limit or condition these thresholds (ex pluribus Guiglia, 2007). In addition, the State 
has exclusive legislative power on ‘general provisions on education’ and ‘social security’. 
The competence on ‘job protection and safety’, ‘education, subject to the autonomy of 
educational institutions and with the exception of vocational education and training’, ‘large 
transport and navigation networks’, ‘communications’, ‘national production, transport and 
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distribution of energy’, ‘complementary and supplementary social security’, ‘co-ordination 
of public finance and taxation system’, and on the ‘enhancement of cultural and 
environmental properties, including the promotion and organisation of cultural activities’ is 
shared between State and Regions. Moreover, the ‘Regions have legislative powers in all 
subject matters that are not expressly covered by State legislation’.  
The State certainly has strong legislative powers over disability issues, since it is in 
charge of the ‘determination of the basic level of benefits relating to civil and social rights’. 
Such a cross-cutting national competence implies that whenever a regional law provides for 
benefits related to civil or welfare rights, it must be subordinated to the national law that 
establishes the minimum standards with regard to those rightsXXVII. Up to now, the 
Constitutional Court has recognised this key responsibility of the State in legislating on 
disability. Accordingly, it has so far rejected a constitutional review for violation of the 
division of competences of the most important national pieces of legislation on disability, 
the abovementioned Law 104/1992, and of other national laws. However, there is a myriad 
of regional laws and regulations governing the situation of people with disabilities, and 
coordination between State and Regions is essential to exert the full potential of the CRPD. 
Representatives of the so called State-Regions Conference (Conferenza Stato-Regioni)XXVIII, 
a cooperative body established to discuss issues of regional interest, are included in the 
National Observatory, which is preparing the future national action plan for disability. 
Thus, a certain degree of coordination is achieved within the National Observatory. 
However, it is fairly unclear whether and how further and additional contacts with the 
Regions will take place. Moreover, at present, there is no sign of projects or attempts to 
appoint regional focal points. 
It seems at least regrettable that there is no formal and explicit involvement of the 
Regions in the implementation process. The lack of regional focal points can (potentially) 
cause gaps and inconsistencies and may jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the 
Convention, but more generally it can hamper the realization of an effective disability 
policy making structure. In addition, this choice seems to frustrate the subsidiarity principle 
and the principle of autonomy, expressly affirmed in the Italian ConstitutionXXIX. 
Thus, even if the choice of electing a single focal point is formally obedient to Art. 
33(1) CRPD and brings considerable practical (and financial) advantages, it is uncertain 
whether this solution really fits into the Italian system in the same manner as it might be 
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adequate for States with a minimum level of decentralization (traditionally referred to as 
unitary).  
 
4.3 The Directorate-General for Inclusion and Social Policies as a Coordination 
Mechanism: What kind of coordination will be provided? 
As regards the designation of the Directorate as coordination mechanism, a few 
remarks can be added.  
First, it is useful to recall that the Convention does not provide for a clear distinction 
between the focal point and the coordination mechanism, neither from the point of view 
of the structural requirements nor the functions to be performed. The doctrine has also 
been quite vague. Even the OHCHR study has not provided a fruitful and lucid guidance, 
since it advocates the designation of an overall focal point, in toto similar to the 
coordination mechanism, and it is unclear how this would distinguish itself from the 
coordination mechanism, where it exists (UN Human Rights Council, 2010, para. 33). The 
Italian choice to designate the same Directorate reflects this substantial lack of clarity.XXX  
It must be noted that the Directorate should carry out horizontal coordination (i.e. 
among different Ministries within the Government). However, it is not certain how this is 
taking place. Despite the fact that informal coordination has taken place up to now, no 
relations with other bodies or directorates in other Ministries have been formalized. In 
addition, there is no involvement of parliamentary structures. That is quite surprising given 
that Parliament alone enjoys legislative power, i.e. the capacity to adopt appropriate laws to 
implement the Convention. 
As regard vertical coordination (i.e. cooperation among different level of governments), 
there seems to be, at present, no open cooperation with the Regions. This is probably so 
because, as we will see in the subsequent section, such coordination is taking place within 
the National Observatory, which is a true composite body in which representatives of the 
government, local authorities and civil society try to find a synthesis to implement the goals 
put forward by the CRPD. 
The coordination mechanism should have been an opportunity to reinforce the 
cooperation among different ministries (an explicit commitment of the Directorate in this 
respect in view of fully implementing the Convention), but also to reinforce vertical 
coordination among different territorial administrations. However, it appears that the 
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formal coincidence among focal point and coordination mechanism and the substantial 
absence of coordination with the Regions blur the situation and ultimately frustrate the 
spirit of Art. 33(1) CRPD in this respect.  
 
5. Independent Monitoring or Government Control over the 
Convention? 
 
5.1 The National Observatory on the Situation of Persons with Disabilities: A Brief 
Overview 
The complexity of the transposition of Art. 33(2) CRPD is well known and recognised 
by both scholars and DPOs. The difficulty of setting up an independent mechanism 
compliant with the Paris Principles, especially for those countries which do not have a 
National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) (de Beco, 2011; de Beco, 2008), and the need 
for a framework capable of carrying out the complex tasks mentioned under Art. 33(2) 
have challenged several States. Many of them, also within the EU, are still in the process of 
choosing whether to designate or establish a framework, as well as examining how to set 
up an independent mechanism. Even in Sweden, a country with a strong welfare structure 
and an efficient and well-rooted disability policy, the implementation of Art. 33(2) has 
encountered some troubles. 
By contrast, Italy did not vacillate and, from the very beginning, opted for setting up a 
new structure, the National Observatory on the Situation of Persons with Disabilities 
(Osservatorio nazionale sulla condizione delle persone con disabilità).  
The National Observatory was envisaged in the ratification law (i.e. in Art. 3 of Law 
18/2009) and then created by a specific bylaw, Decree No. 167 of 6 July 2010 (Regulation 
of the National Observatory, hereinafter Decree 167/2010),XXXI which entered into force in 
October 2010. The text of the Regulation was preceded by a consultation process which 
involved all major DPOs and is the result of a common will to create an adequate body to 
fully implement the Convention.XXXII Nevertheless, it seems that no other options but the 
creation of this Observatory were taken into consideration: neither the creation of an 
NHRI nor the creation of a framework was examined. A subsequent Ministerial Decree of 
30 November 2010 set up the National Observatory and nominated its members.  
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With regard to its structure, the Observatory is organisationally placed within the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policies in Rome (Art. 1 of Decree 167/2010) and also 
financed by it. In compliance with Art. 4(1) of Decree 167/2010, the Directorate-General 
for Inclusion and Social Policies functions as the Observatory’s technical secretariat.  
According to Law 18/2009, the number of members should not exceed 40 and must 
respect the principle of equal opportunities between men and woman. The Decree of 30 
November nominated 40 members, which included nine representatives of various 
ministries, two representatives of local authorities (of Province and Municipalities, 
respectively), two representatives of the Conference State-Regions, two representatives of 
the Social Security Institutions (INPS and INPDAP), one representative of the National 
Statistics Institute (ISTAT), seven representatives of social partners (trade unions and 
industry organisations), 14 representatives of organisations of persons with disabilities 
(many of them part of the National Council on Disability, the Consiglio Nazionale sulla 
Disabilità CND)XXXIII as well as three independent experts. The National Observatory also 
includes ten permanent guest members (invitati permanenti), without voting rights, who are 
mainly representatives of civil societyXXXIV. It is not clear what the function of these 
participants is, but they certainly increase the inner pluralism of the body and could provide 
input and feedback on the activities carried out. The National Observatory is chaired by 
the representative of the Ministry (Art. 3 (2) of Law 18/2009). 
Within the National Observatory, according to Art. 3 (1) of the Decree 167/2010 a 
Scientific Committee was constituted. This Scientific Committee is composed of two 
representatives of the Ministries (namely one representative of the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policies and one representative of the Ministry of Health), one representative of the 
Regions and one of the local authorities, three representatives of organizations of disabled 
persons, and three experts (chosen by the Ministry). Its task is to determine the technical 
orientation of the Observatory. 
With regard to its mandate, Art. 1 of Decree 167/2010 expressly defines the National 
Observatory as a consultative body in charge of technical-scientific support for the 
elaboration of national disability policies. Its tasks are namely to promote the 
implementation of the Convention, to prepare the biannual action plan for promoting 
rights of persons with disabilities, to monitor disability policies in Italy, and to promote 
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studies and research activities on disability, including the collection of statistical data on the 
situation of persons with disabilities.XXXV  
The preparation of a biannual action plan is certainly one of the most noteworthy tasks. 
In particular, the plan is to be discussed in and prepared by the National Observatory. It is 
then to be adopted by Decree of the Presidency of the Republic upon the proposal of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, after approval by the Council of Ministers, thus 
taking the rank of a bylaw. 
It must be noted that the National Observatory is provided with an annual budget of 
500.000 EUR, from 2009 to 2014, funded by the general budget of the Ministry; decisions 
on the use of funds are taken by the Ministry and the Observatory (by consensus)XXXVI. In 
2010, almost the whole annual budget was spent on an agreement with the Institute for the 
development of vocational training of workers (Istituto per lo sviluppo della formazione 
professionale dei lavoratori- ISFOL) for the preparation of the biannual action plan. In 2011, 
most of the budget was allocated for an agreement with ISTAT on the collection of 
updated statistical data on disability. 
Remarkably, the National Observatory has started to operate relatively quickly after its 
creation, not least thanks to the pressure placed on it by DPOs. After its first meeting, 
which took place on 16 December 2010, the National Observatory began to elaborate a 
procedural document to establish its own working scheme. On May 2011, Methodological 
Notes on the organization of the work of this body were released, approved on 6 July 
2011. The latter (soft law) document was the first tangible act of the National Observatory 
itself, and shows a strong commitment to the preparation of the report to be submitted to 
the CRPD Committee, to the biannual disability action plan setting forth policy priorities as 
well as to the revision of statistical indices to monitor the implementation of the 
Convention more effectively. Through these Notes, six working groups were constituted, 
each of them ‘chaired’ by a DPO member. Each group undertook a separate line of 
analysis with a somewhat different purpose, and the results of each have been gathered to 
contribute to the elaboration of the State report to be submitted to the CRPD Committee.  
 
5.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the National Observatory 
Since Italy does not have a NHRI and the wording of the Convention leaves the door 
open to the designation of a single existing (or new) independent mechanism as a 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
69 
framework, the choice to create a new body was probably the most suitable and easiest way 
to implement Art. 33(2). Nevertheless, from the overview provided above, it lucidly 
appears that the National Observatory is an ‘odd’, hybrid body, more similar to the 
coordination mechanism of Art. 33(1) than to the monitoring mechanism envisaged in Art. 
33(2). It is certainly an interesting body and presents considerable strengths, but also 
important weaknesses and a substantial lack of compliance with the Paris Principles.  
As mentioned above, according to these principles, independence and pluralism of a 
mechanism must be guaranteed. In particular, independence has a triple meaning in the 
Paris Principles: functional independence (i.e. freedom from governmental interference), 
personal independence (i.e. the members of the mechanism should be able to act in a 
pressure-free environment and be appointed according to a fair and clear procedure), and 
financial independence (i.e. the independent mechanism must have sufficient resources at 
its disposal and manage its own budget, that is decide by itself how best to allocate 
funding).  
It appears at first glance that the composition of the National Observatory is plural and 
ensures appropriate inputs from different sectors in society while offering an opportunity 
to confront different perspectives, but that is also ensures the mainstreaming. In addition, 
it is remarkable that representatives of the Regions are also part of this body. This can help 
to ensure a certain degree of coordination in implementing the Convention, especially in 
areas of regional competence. The number of people with disabilities appointed as 
members is also noteworthy, especially considering that initially it was provided that only a 
minimum of 20% of DPO members should sit within the National ObservatoryXXXVII.  
But even if a pluralist representation of social forces is ensured, functional and financial 
independence is far from guaranteed. Government departments are heavily represented 
and, differently from what happens for example in the Austrian Monitoringausschuss, they 
also participate in the deliberations. As mentioned, this considerable presence of members 
of the bureaucracy makes the Observatory an amalgam, more similar to a coordination 
body than to the framework/independent mechanism provided for in Art. 33(2). In 
addition, the National Observatory is not given a fully independent budget: the amount 
allocated to it comes from the budget of the Ministry, even if expenditures are agreed 
concomitantly. 
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The Scientific Committee inside the National Observatory also has a pluralist 
composition: it creates the impression of a sort of ‘small Observatory’. It is notable that the 
Committee is linked to civil society: the fact that three of its members come from DPOs 
unequivocally shows an effort to include persons with disabilities in the monitoring 
process, as required by Art. 33 CRPD. It is also apparent that the Committee is intended to 
be a technical body, but it is not really clear whether it should represent an independent 
mechanism. It is evident that in terms of lacking organizational and functional 
independence this does not comply with the Paris Principles. A crucial point is that, again, 
many of its members are representatives of the ministries and, more generally, of the public 
administration. In addition, the tasks given to the Scientific Committee consist more in 
technical advice to the implementation process of Convention, rather than in monitoring, 
promoting and protecting it. 
Even if the terms ‘framework, including one or more independent mechanisms’ may be 
considered ambiguous, it has been underlined by many scholars that such a framework 
must include truly independent mechanisms, since the promotion, protection and 
monitoring of the implementation of the Convention must be carried out by bodies that 
fully comply with the Paris Principles. Although the wording of Art. 33(2) leaves the Parties 
with a great deal of flexibility and allows the inclusion in the framework of different organs 
and institutions (e.g. parliamentary commissions, judicial organs…), it imposes the 
designation and establishment of one (or several) independent mechanism(s) fully 
compliant with the Paris Principles. The National Observatory and its Scientific Committee 
are quite far away from being free from any governmental interference  
Finally, as regards the Observatory’s tasks, Art. 33(2) makes it clear that there are three 
distinct (but inextricably linked) dimensions of the assignment to be carried out by any 
framework: protect, promote and monitor the implementation of the CRPD. In this 
respect, the OHCHR study affirms that ‘promotion’ includes a broad range of activities, 
from awareness raising to scrutiny for compliance of existing national legislation, 
regulations and practices (UN Human Rights Council, 2009, para. 64).XXXVIII Analogously, 
the task of ‘protection’ includes investigation and examination of individual and/or group 
complaints, the provision of mediation, strategic litigation, and even representing plaintiffs 
in front of courts and tribunals (UN Human Rights Council, 2009, para. 66). Lastly, the 
OHCHR study explicitly states that ‘monitoring’ can only be achieved through assessing 
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progress, stagnation or retrogression in the enjoyment of rights over a certain period of 
time (UN Human Rights Council, 2009, para. 77).XXXIX The activities of the National 
Observatory, mentioned in Art. 3(5) of Law 18/2009, allude to the monitoring of the 
implementation of the Convention, as well as to promotion of the rights of persons with 
disabilities. But the task of protection is not even mentioned. Certainly the framework is 
unable to carry out any form of quasi-judicial function.  
This analysis of the National Observatory makes apparent there was a valuable attempt 
to create a pluralist, participatory, specialized and multifunctional body. However, due to 
its substantive lack of compliance with the Paris Principles, one may easily conclude that Italy 
has not properly implemented Art. 33(2) CRPD yet. 
 
5.3 Is there Room for Improvement? 
On the basis of the arguments cited thus far, the establishment of the National 
Observatory is (at least) insufficient to comply with Art. 33(2) CRPD, as it was also noted 
in the ISGI’s studyXL. Since at this stage a modification of the body is unlikely to happen, 
an easy way out would be to create, in addition, a truly independent para-judicial body, i.e. 
an independent administrative authority, modelled after other administrative authorities 
(e.g. the Antitrust Authority, or the Data Protection Authority). This means that it should 
be authorized to hear and consider complaints and petitions and conciliate or issue binding 
decisions – the National Observatory does not have any of these prerogatives.  
The creation of an NHRI would, probably, be the best option in abstracto (better even 
than the setting up of an independent administrative authority), but it is difficult to predict 
whether this is feasible. Indeed, a new law on the creation of an Italian NHRI is currently 
under consideration in the Senate, but it is not clear when (and if) it will be approved.XLI It 
must be noted that the bill under discussion is the latest in a series of drafts never passed: a 
first draft law was already approved in April 2007 by the Chamber of Deputies, but 
remained to be endorsed by the Senate. Another draft was introduced into the Senate in 
late 2009 and discussed in February 2010. The current bill, presented on 5 May 2011, is 
going through a complex parliamentary iter: the upcoming elections and the harsh 
economic crisis are quite likely to delay its final endorsement. 
The formal involvement of the judiciary (almost absent, up to now) could also be an 
option, even if the form of such an involvement should be carefully considered. Certainly 
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the creation of ‘extraordinary or special judges’ is forbidden by Art. 102 of the 
Constitution. However, since specialised sections for specific matters within the ordinary 
judicial bodies may be established, such an option (its pros and cons) should be explored. 
In addition, relations between the National Observatory and other bodies already in 
place (such as the Istituto per lo sviluppo della formazione professionale dei lavoratori (ISFOL), which 
will, according to the Methodological notes, carry out the legislative analysis for the report 
to be submitted to the CRPD Committee, or the Permanent Observatory on Integration of 
Pupils with Disabilities - Osservatorio permanente per l’integrazione degli alunni con disabilità)XLII) 
should be optimized and clarified. Up to now, an informal collaboration with the 
Observatory on Infancy and Adolescence (Osservatorio per l’Infanzia e l’Adolescenza)XLIII has 
been conducted, but a formal and more transparent partnership is advisable. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
 
Perhaps it is too early to examine whether the ‘reshaping’ of Italian disability policy 
making has been conducive to a proper implementation of the CRPD and to, ultimately, 
empower persons with disabilities. The changes that have taken place indisputably require 
long-term evaluation. However, the overview provided for here allows us to draw some 
concluding remarks.  
The ratification of the CRPD in Italy has not led to substantial processes of change, 
but it has certainly led to a partial reassessment of disability policy making which has 
involved only the State. The Regions have been substantially absent from this process. No 
regional focal points have been established. This is particularly regrettable considering the 
relevant competences that Regions possess in social matters and areas like culture or 
territorial organisation, which are crucial for implementing the Convention. 
All in all, it can be noted that the implementation of Art. 33(2) is revealing to be 
problematic. The National Observatory as a sort of consultative participatory structure 
(regardless of its lack of compliance with Art. 33(2) CRPD) is just the starting point, but 
cannot be considered a point of arrival. Still Italy is not fully in compliance with the CRPD, 
it should more convincingly engage in the construction of a true framework formed by a 
network of structures to capture the transformative potential of the CRPD. 
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 PhD in European and Italian Constitutional Law, Attorney at Law (Verona Bar). All translations from an 
original Italian text, other than the Italian Constitution (including the decisions commented), are mine. The 
English translation of the Italian Constitution is published by the Parliamentary Information, Archives and 
Publications Office of the Senate Service for Official Reports and Communication and can be found at 
<http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf>. I am indebted to 
researchers at the Centre for Disability Law and Policy of the National University of Ireland, Galway, for 
their comments on a first draft. Of course, all errors and opinions remain my own. 
I Law of 3 March 2009 n.18 ‘Ratifica ed esecuzione della Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti delle persone con disabilità, 
con Protocollo opzionale, fatta a New York il 13 dicembre 2006 e istituzione dell’Osservatorio nazionale sulla condizione delle persone 
con disabilità’, in G.U. n. 61 of 14 March 2009. 
II The changes that are taking place have been boosted by civil society actors, trade unions and by organizations 
that represent people with disabilities who aim to combat discrimination and marginalization: all of these actors 
form networks, mobilize campaigns that advance disability rights through advocacy, and try to communicate with 
public institutions with a great emphasis on the Convention. 
III The ‘medical’ model tends to view persons with disabilities as ‘objects’ who are to be managed or cared for. The 
‘social’ or ‘human rights’ model views persons with disabilities as subjects and not objects, emphasising respect for 
the equal human rights of persons with disabilities. 
IV This formulation recalls the one used in the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT), 
which requires States to give due consideration to these Principles when designating or establishing national 
prevention mechanisms. 
V United Nations General Assembly A/RES/48/134 85th plenary meeting, 20 December 1993. The Paris Principles 
were defined at the first International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights in Paris on 7-9 October 1991 and adopted by United Nations Human Rights Commission 
Resolution 1992/54 of 1992 and General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 1993.  
VI Estonia and Greece completed the ratification process in May 2012. The Netherlands is still in the process of 
ratifying the Convention.  
VII ISTAT 2003, see <http://www.disabilitaincifre.it/prehome/quanti_disabiliinitalia.asp> (accessed 10 August 
2012).   
VIII According to the European Court of Justice, the principle of sincere cooperation governs relations between the 
EU and the Member States during all phases of an international agreement to which both the EU and the Member 
States are going to be parties to (see inter alia Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. 
2871). 
IX On Article 117(1) of the Constitution, introduced after the 2001 constitutional reform, there has been a flushed 
debate among scholars. According to some scholars, Art. 117(1) should be referred to only as regards the 
relationship between State and Regions because its purpose is not that of governing the hierarchy of sources 
(Pinelli, 2001; Cannizzaro, 2001). Others (e.g.. Guazzarotti, 2006: 505) argued that norms implementing 
international law obligations into the domestic order can serve as an interposed standard of review (an 
interpretation which has then been adopted by the Italian Constitutional Court).  
X Art. 11 reads as follows: ‘Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and 
as a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to 
the limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. 
Italy promotes and encourages international organizations furthering such ends’.  
XI ‘Mixity’ refers to the fact that one part of an international agreement falls within the scope of the powers of the 
EC/EU while another part falls within the scope of the powers of Member States (on mixed agreements see inter 
alia Heliskoski, 2001; Hillion, Koutrakos, 2010). 
XII <http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idstr=127&idnot=47673> (accessed 30 July 2012). Another recent 
important decision of Tribunale di Varese was recently released: Decree of 9 July 2012, see at 
<http://www.personaedanno.it> (accessed 25 August 2012). 
XIII Inter alia Consiglio di Stato 16 March 2011, n. 1607; Consiglio di Stato, sez. III, 10 July 2012, n. 4085 at 
<http://www.giustizia-amministrativa.it/> (accessed 30 July 2012). 
XIV Case 80/2010 of 22 February 2010 at < http://www.cortecostituzionale.it> (accessed 30 July 2012). 
XV Art. 38(3) affirms that ‘disabled and handicapped persons are entitled to receive education and vocational 
training’. According to Art. 38(4) ‘Responsibilities under this article are entrusted to entities and institutions 
established by or supported by the State’.  
XVI Art. 10 of the Decree of 7 April 2011 No. 144 (in GU 197 of 25 August 2011) re-organized the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policies. See 
<http://www.lavoro.gov.it/Lavoro/Istituzionale/Ministero/AmministrazioneCentrale/DG_Inclusione.htm> 
(accessed 28 August 2012). 
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XVII Many (in fact, almost all) of them designated as focal point for matters relating the implementation of the 
Convention the Ministry of Welfare, Labour, Social Affair/Policy (different according to each national 
denomination), or an internal structure of the Ministry itself (e.g. Romania), generally pre-existing, or a specific 
body within the Ministry or somewhat linked to it (e.g., Spain). 
XVIII Open-ended consultation on National Frameworks for the Implementation and Monitoring of the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities organised by the OHCHR, Geneva, October 26 2009, at 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/docs/ReportConsultation26102009.doc> (accessed 20 March 
2012). 
XIX The Committee was originally created by the Ministerial Decree of 15 February 1978, No. 519, then modified in 
2007 by Ministerial Decree <http://www.cidu.esteri.it/ComitatoDirittiUmani/>. The Committee of Ministries for 
Orientation and Strategic Guidance on Human Rights Protection (Comitato dei Ministri per l’indirizzo e la guida 
strategica in materia di tutela dei diritti umani), created in 2007 by a Decree of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers 
and attached to the Presidency of the Council of Minister, could also have represented a good option. It must be 
noted, however, that at present this Committee has ‘disappeared’ from the structure of the Presidency. 
XX See also <http://www.lavoro.gov.it/Lavoro/md/AreaSociale/Disabilita/> (accessed 28 August 2012). 
XXI E.g. in Spain a single focal point for matters relating to the implementation of the Convention has been 
designated. It is the Consejo Nacional de la Discapacidad (National Disability Council), now regulated by Royal Decree 
No. 1855/2009 of 4 December 2009).  
XXII See the Third Disability High Level Group report on the implementation of the CRPD in the Member States 
(2010), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=5070&langId=en> (accessed 30 August 2012).  
XXIII The Directorate (and the whole Ministry) is promoting studies on disability. It deserves to be mentioned that a 
new report on disability has been published on the website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. G. Gori 
(ed), Il sistema di protezione e cura delle persone non autosufficienti Prospettive, risorse e gradualità degli interventi, at 
<http://www.lavoro.gov.it/Lavoro/Strumenti/StudiStatistiche/> (accessed 10 May 2012). 
XXIV The UK designated the Office for Disability Issues (ODI)XXIV, a cross-government organisation set up in 
January 2005. ODI works with government departments, disabled people and a wide range of external groups. 
Separate focal points were also appointed for devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
and the ODI itself functions as regional focal point for England. Several focal points were considered necessary to 
respect the UK devolutionary system and competences of sub-national entities, which touch upon many areas 
covered by the Convention (e.g. education, housing or social work).  
XXV This choice was made because disability policies are a mix of policy measures belonging to the competency of 
the federal state (e.g. anti-discrimination law, quotas for federal civil servants, disability benefits), the regions (e.g. 
wage subsidies) or the communities (e.g. vocational training, culture and leisure). All the structures indicated as 
focal points were already pre-existing. At the federal level, the General Administration of Persons with Disabilities 
(Direction générale des Personnes handicapées), within the Federal Public Service Social Security (SPF Sécurité sociale)XXV 
was designated. In the Flemish Region, the Flemish Agency for Disabled People (Vlaams Agentschap voor Personen met 
een Handicap, VAPH) was designated. In the Walloon region and in the German-speaking community the focal 
points are, respectively, the Agency for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (Agence Wallonne pour l’Intégration 
des Personnes handicapées)XXV and the Authority for Persons with Disabilities (Dienststelle für Personen mit Behinderung). 
The Francophone Brussels Service for Persons with Disabilities (Service bruxellois francophone des personnes handicapées) 
is responsible for implementing disability policy in Brussels, but it has not yet formally been appointed as focal 
point. 
XXVI The Länder are on the way to establish their own focal points. At present, the Austrian focal point is the 
Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection (BMASK) together with the Federal Social 
Office, which has nine Offices as local contact points. 
XXVII Ex pluribus on this competence, see the Constitutional court’s decisions No 248/2006; No. 50/2008; No. 
207/2010; No. 248/2011. 
XXVIII <http://www.statoregioni.it/> (accessed 31 August 2012). 
XXIX Art. 118 and Art. 5 of the Italian Constitution. 
XXX Best practices seem to be those of States which experimented with ‘mixed bodies’ for coordination. For 
example, Denmark, with only a single focal point, has decided to set up a coordination mechanism to deal with 
horizontal coordination of disability issues within the government, i.e. to facilitate contacts among different 
ministries. The Danish inter-ministerial committee of civil servants on disability matters within the Ministry Social 
Affairs is not devoted to coordinate the activities of focal points, since there is only one focal point, but instead has 
to facilitate cross-cutting activities in different sectors, share knowledge about the individual ministries’ tasks in 
order to increase awareness of when a problem affects several sectors, and to solve ad hoc tasks for the 
government of disability. It includes representatives of all ministries, and disability organisations are also involved 
in the committee’s work. In this inter-ministerial committee persons with disabilities take up an essential role in 
caring for general interests together with public authorities.  
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XXXI Ministerial Decree of 6 July 2010, No. 167 ‘Regolamento recante disciplina dell'Osservatorio nazionale sulla condizione 
delle persone con disabilità ai sensi dell’articolo 3 della legge 3 marzo 2009, n. 18’ (Entry into force 23/10/2010), available at  
<http://www.lavoro.gov.it/Lavoro/md/AreaSociale/Disabilita/Osservatorio/> (accessed 20 July 2012). 
XXXII See reply of the Vice-Ministry of Labour, Michel Martone, to the Deputee of the radical party Luca Coscioni, 
on 16 April 2012. 
XXXIII The DPOs represented are: FAND (Federazione Associazioni Nazionali Disabili), UIC (Unione Italiana Ciechi), 
ENS (Ente Nazionale Sordi), ANMIL (Associazione Nazionale Mutilati e Invalidi Lavoro), UNMS (Unione Nazionale 
Mutilati per Servizio), ANMIC (Associazione Nazionale Mutilati e Invalidi Civili), FISH (Federazione Italiana Superamento 
Handicap), FAIP (Federazione Associazioni Italiane Para-Tetraplegici), EDF (European Disability Forum), DPI (Disabled 
Peoples’International), FIADDA (Famiglie Italiane Associate per la Difesa dei Diritti degli Audiolesi), ANFFAS 
(Associazione Nazionale di Famiglie di Persone con Disabilità Intellettiva e/o Relazionale), Autismo Italia, FIABA (Fondo 
Italiano Abbattimento Barriere Architettoniche), COORDOWN, UNIAMO F.I.M.R. Onlus (Federazione Italiana Malattie 
Rare) and Gli Amici di Luca. 
XXXIV Art. 2 of the Decree of 30 November 2010. 
XXXV Art. 3 (5) of Law 18/2009. 
XXXVI Art. 8 of Decree 167/2010. 
XXXVII See reply of the Vice-Ministry of Labour, Michel Martone, to the Deputy of the radical party Luca Coscioni, 
on 16 April 2012. 
XXXVIII UN Human Rights Council, Thematic study by the Office of the United Nations on the structure and role of national 
mechanisms for the implementation and monitoring of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, para. 64. 
XXXIX In the 2010 Guide for Monitoring released by the OHCHR, it is expressly stated that: ‘Monitoring activities 
could: Provide national monitoring mechanisms with information on the state of implementation of the 
Convention; Provide information to the Committee for its constructive dialogue with States; Identify potential 
breaches of the rights of individuals under the Convention which could form the basis of a communication to the 
Committee under the Optional Protocol if the State concerned has ratified it; Identify reliable information on grave 
or systematic violations of the Convention which could be submitted to encourage the Committee to undertake an 
inquiry under the Optional Protocol if the State concerned has ratified it; Follow up on recommendations of the 
national monitoring mechanisms and the Committee to strengthen implementation of the Convention’ (OHCHR, 
2010: 32-33). 
XL See supra ft. 13. 
XLI Bill on the setting up of the National Commission for the promotion and protection of human rights (DDL 
C4534 ‘Istituzione della Commissione nazionale per la promozione e la protezione dei diritti umani’) 
<http://www.senato.it/leg/16/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/37199.htm > (accessed 31 August 2012). 
XLII In January 2012 a Permanent Observatory on Pupils with Disabilities (Osservatorio permanente per l’integrazione degli 
alunni con disabilità) has been established within the Ministry of Education. The functioning of this Observatory is 
still unclear. However, this body could certainly be part of the network. 
XLIII <http://www.minori.it/osservatorio>. 
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